Revisiting the role of Vallabhbhai Patel in the Making of
Modern India
Hitendra K Patel
There has
been a perception among a large number of people that the Congress was a
platform of people with diverse ideological orientations which kept leaders and
people together due to the national movement and the need for keeping Indian
voices together to successfully facing the British imperialism. Once the
British decided to leave these ideological differences surfaced leading to
contestations among them for political power game. In this context, the leaders
of the Congress have been seen as divided along the “left” and “the right”
lines. In this formulation, the division was fundamental and there was a real
ideological struggle to control the organisation –the Congress. According to
this view, the conflict between the “right” (represented by Patel) and the
“left” (represented by Nehru) was ideological in nature and the differences
were so fundamental that it persisted till the last, till the death of Patel in
1950. To some scholars, Patel was a rabid communal in his outlook while Nehru
represented secular nationalism. The assessment of these two most formidable
Congress leaders have been seen this way and it has been claimed that, “the
Sangha parivar worships one (Patel) and hates the “other” (Nehru)” due to this.[1] There
has been a growing divide on this issue and more and more people belonging to
the “political right” seem to underline that Patel was a pragmatic, realistic
leader while Nehru was idealistic in his approach to deal with the complex
political challenges India had faced.
This paper seeks to argue that while
making a historical assessment of Patel the context’s complexities must be kept
in mind. The differences between Patel and Nehru and various moves and
utterances of Patel, which are cited as evidences of his “rabid communal”
outlook must be examined in the context these were applicable. If that is done,
the historians would be able to make a nuanced and balanced assessment of
Vallabhbhai Patel. It is obvious that in a short paper like this, all aspects
of this complex issue cannot be addressed; the focus, here, is mainly on some
misconceptions about Patel’s role in this phase which try to see in his deeds
and words communal outlook.
Patel,
unlike Nehru, Azad and Rajgopalachari, sided with Gandhi on the issue of 1942
movement. Going by the indications in 1945, when the national movement leaders
were released from jails, Patel was convinced that their stand was vindicated.
The British government did not seem to give priority to India in 1945.
Churchill, the prime minister of Great Britain, in his forty minute discussion
with Wavell, categorically said that India was not his priority and India could
be divided into Pakistan, Hindustan and Princestan.[2]
The Viceroy had decided to call Indian leaders to Simla for talks. Vallabhhai
Patel was released from the jail on June 15, 1945, and he said to his
supporters –“Be ready. Self –government is round the corner.”[3]
In
the next twenty six months, India and Pakistan were actually created and the
third one –Princestan could not be created. How this process had begun and
progressed and who were the principal actors in this “transfer of power” is a
well attested area. But, somehow, one of the principal figures –Sardar Vallabh
Bhai Patel’s role is not very well examined and there are great deal of
confusion about his role. His role as the unifier is acknowledged but there is
a great deal of debate over his ideological leanings. Commentators and
historians have found many deficiencies in his handling of affairs, some of
them went on to blame him as the person who, under the influence of V. P.
Menon, mooted the idea of division of India which gave Jinnah the opportunity
to materialised his somewhat vague demand of Pakistan. Patel was seen as the
man who through his “arm twisting” managed to control the Congress and the
negotiations with the League in his own way. He was seen as a leader and
somewhat ignored the wishes of Gandhi, Nehru and Maulana Azad, who were not
willing to agree to the division of the country.
Vallabhbhai
Patel was physically unwell when he came out of jail. The intestinal problem
for which he was treated in 1941 had recurred. He had to spend considerable
time in a Poona clinic. The Congress accepted the proposals of Shimla which had
offered a representative Executive Council with equal number of Hindus and
Muslims, plus a Hindu Schedule Caste member and some other minorities. But,
Jinnah rejected it and he asked the exclusive right to choose the Muslim
members. Wavell did not like Jinnah’s uncompromising attitude but he did not
want Jinnah to lose his ground. Perhaps the 1942 movement days had been alive
in his mind. The failure of Shimla talks “soared Jinnah’s stock” says Rajmohan
Gandhi. Rajmohan Gandhi has made a very appropriate observation that, “ten
months earlier, the Muslim masses had seen the Mahatma knocking on the door.
Now they saw the Viceroy yielding to him. And Muslim politicians saw a barren
future for themselves unless they were linked with Jinnah.”[4]
At
this point, Wavell, well aware of Patel’s influence as “the real driving force
behind Congress’ aggressive policy”, did not like to negotiate with him.
Patel’s aggressive and plain speaking could not have been of his liking. Patel
looked convinced that the much talked about Hindu Muslim divide is basically
the imperial government’s doing. He had said once:
The
British talk of Hindu-Muslim quarrels but who has thrust this burden on their
shoulders? If they are sincere let them hand over to Congress or the League or
accept international arbitration.
Give
me just a week’s rule over Britain. I will create such disagreements that
England, Wales and Scotland will fight one another for ever.
Patel,
however, was not happy with the leniency Gandhi had been showing to Jinnah. He
was in command of the Congress and when the election board was constituted with
Rajendra Prasad, Jayant Kripalani, Govind Ballabh Pant, Pattabhi Sitaramaiya,
Deo and Asaf as members and Maulana Azad
as the chairman, Patel, with the designation of “Member in charge” was totally in
charge of affairs. Barring Asaf all followed Patel. As dignified fund raiser
his prestige was unparalleled in the organisation. A pragmatic man, he was
conscious of the importance of money in elections. He wrote to Azad that the
Congress must not lose any seat for want of money. He requested Nehru to write
an election manifesto with Quit-India as its basis which Nehru did.
At this stage, he left the post of president of Gujarat
Pradesh Congress Committee after holding it for twenty five years. Patel’s
humility and his generosity were also remarkable as he put organisational
interests before anything. He welcomed C. Rajgopalachari to the Congress again
forgetting his differences and defended him against sceptics who raised
Rajgopalachari’s opposition to Quit India movement. Generally, Patel is seen as
a person who disliked Subhas Chandra Bose, but his opposition to Bose’s
policies had not diminished his respect for Subhas. Patel claimed him in 1945
as a “fellow fighter” and a colleague. Patel also led the committee constituted
to assist the relatives of INA soldiers. He and Sarat Bose had mutual respect
for each other. Some of the charges levelled against Patel have emerged from
Maulana Azad’s views. But, it seems, those are not correct ones. The charge
that Patel excluded Bhulabhai Desai from the list of executive council is not
valid one. Gandhi himself had said clearly in his letter that Patel is not
responsible for this.
Fund-raising for the organisation was done by Patel and he
ignored Mahatma Gandhi’s wish not to do so. He was practical enough to realise
that the organisation needed money. When Gandhi complained against Patel about
it to Birla, which was conveyed to Patel he said, “That is not his concern.
Gandhi is a Mahatma. I am not. I have to do the job.”[5]
Rajmohan Gandhi makes a very subtle remark on Gandhi’s
changing relationship with Patel. Earlier Gandhi used to refer Patel as a
younger brother, an aide, but now he started referring him “as a son”, who
could lead his own life, says Rajmohan Gandhi.
At this stage, Patel was going his own way. He decided to
ignore Agha Khan’s advice to reach out to Jinnah for settlement. Following the
disastrous results of 1945-46 elections from the Congress point of view, the
political equations changed. This result had a huge impact of Patel and he seemed
to have accepted that the Hindu-Muslim unity is a questionable matter and the
context determines the nature of relationship between these communities. He
hoped that with some more work the understanding can be revived. Yet, as
pointed out by Rajmohan Gandhi, unlike Nehru, Patel never seriously tried to
claim that he represented Muslims.
The pragmatic Patel proved a far better judge of the
political situation. When INA trial ended and verdict of the three accused,
despite being sentenced to life imprisonment, were not executed, considering
the popular mood, Patel was quick to realise that the British were
contemplating to leave India.[6]
Patel was categorical that the Hindu-Muslim settlement could
not be possible with the mediation of the British.
From the end of March to end of June, 1946, in Delhi, Simla
and again in Delhi Congress talked with the Cabinet Mission, with three members
– Lord Pethick Lawrence, Stafford Cripps and A.V. Alexander. The Congress
representatives were Azad, Patel, Nehru and Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan. Patel spoke
less but his interventions were significant. He rejected the Hindu Muslim
parity at the centre. He was seen as a powerful and uncompromising by Wavell.
Patel was focusing on two key issues- the strong centre and
the compulsory grouping. He was concerned over Assam’s possible inclusion in
the group of group c which was marginally Muslim majority group. The
Congressmen of Assam was not likely to accept this. After lengthy and
unpredictable negotiations, in the third week of June, 1946 things came to a
dead end. Sudhir Ghosh, a young Bengali who had studied at Cambridge has
claimed that he advised Cripps that they should talk to Sardar Patel who was
“the only man amongst the Congress leaders who was a practical statesman.”[7] After
some tense days, the Congress accepted the plan of 16 May on 25 June. At this
point, getting Congress into power and preventing the League an inflated share
of power were two principal objectives of Patel. It was due to his firmness ,
backed by the cleverness of Wavell, Jinnah was not able to gain much during the
97 day long Cabinet Mission (ending on June 16).
The crucial question of the Vice-President of the Viceroy’s
Executive Council came up in April. It was obvious that the man who would hold
this post would be the Prime Minister. Azad wanted to be re-elected, Nehru was
the candidate, Patel was also a contender. April, 29, was the last date of
nomination. On 20th April, Gandhi wrote a letter asking him to
resign so that Jawaharlal could replace him. Gandhi wrote that, “I would if
asked prefer Jawaharlal. I have many reasons for this. Why go into them.”[8] The
organisation wanted Patel. The party was conscious of Sardar’s successful Quit
India exertions, not matached by Jawaharlal, says Rajmohan Gandhi. 12 of the 15
PCCs nominated Patel. No PCC had proposed the name of Jawaharlal. In the
Working Committee meeting Kripalani proposed Nehru’s name. He handed over a
piece of paper with latter’s withdrawal written on it. Vallabhbhai showed the
sheet to Gandhi, who gave Jawaharlal an opportunity to stand down in the
Sardar’s favour. “No PCC has put forward your name, “the Mahatma said to Nehru,
“only the Working Committee has.” Jawaharlal responded with “complete silence”.[9]
This episode has been underplayed by historians like S.
Gopal, the influential biographer of Nehru, who says that, “...there was
general agreement that Jawaharlal should take over.”[10]
He, however, sees its significance very differently by saying that, “Hindsight
has led to much significance being read into his election, it being seen as
part of the Gandhian technique to ease Jawaharlal into the prime ministership
which was looming ahead and deprive Patel of what was his by virtue of his
control over the party machine.”[11] Gopal
offers an interesting observation in this context that, “...at that time no one
saw it in that light. In the summer of 1946 the presidency of the Congress
seemed to bestow immediate responsibility rather than imminent office.”[12]
After Nehru took over as the president of the INC, he
announced on 7 July that the Congress was not bound by anything except that it
would join the Constituent Assembly. This gave the opportunity to attack the
Congress position, and then revoke the acceptance of May 16 proposal. After
that he launched “direct action to achieve Pakistan”.
Nehru’s statement was ill-timed and he made a mistake. Even
Maulana Azad has criticised Nehru’s statement. But, S. Gopal, has defended
Nehru whose utterances were, in the view of the historian, “in line with the
Congress view.”[13] In an
interesting way of editing he has tried to put Patel as a critique of Nehru,
but if we carefully see the full text of Patel’s letter to D. P. Mishra, on the
basis of which S Gopal has written, we find that Nehru had been very sensitive
to Nehru in spite of the fact that his statement had put the Congress in
trouble.
Patel had been considered important by the Viceroy to
resolve an issue when an issue of the role of the Viceroy in the interim
government came up. Through H. V. R. Iengar the Viceroy took the consent of
Patel on 3 August, 1946. Patel became part of Constituent Assembly on 2
September, 1946. Meanwhile, the Muslim League had observed Direct Action Day
during which hundreds of people had been killed.
The League was still sought to be roped in the interim
cabinet by the Viceroy. Patel did not like this idea. Nehru also did not
approve of it, but gave his consent.
In the new cabinet, Sarat Bose, Ali Zaheer and Shafat Ahmed
Khan vacated their places and five League men got inducted. Among these, the
surprising name was Jogen Mandal from Bengal, as “a revenge for nomination of
Asaf Ali” by the Congress. The League joined to the Cabinet without accepting
May 16 proposal much to the dislike of the Congress leaders.
The issue of portfolio came up. The League demanded the Home
ministry which Patel refused to give. He told that he would resign if the Home
ministry was given to the League. By now, Vallabhbhai was quite convinced that
Jinnah was using this opportunity to break up India. The League refused to
accept Nehru as the leader of the cabinet and they met separately under Liaqat
Ali Khan’s chairmanship and under Wavell’s chairmanship when they met with the
Congress leaders. Shankar, the secretary of Vallabhbhai, has remarked that the
ministries under the League were seen as entrenched Muslim camps.[14]
The communal situation worsened and, in October 1946 more
than three hundred Hindus had been killed in Noakhali. Patel asked for a
Cabinet discussion on Noakhali and a central takeover of the affected areas.
These demands were not accepted. Meanwhile, Bihar riots began in which around
7000 were killed. This was followed by the riots of Garhmukteshwar on 8
November and about a thousand Muslims were killed.
Maulana Azad had not joined the cabinet. He wished to prefer
the presidentship of the Congress. Nehru had left it after joining the cabinet,
but the post went to Kripalani. Maulana was not made the president due to
Patel. Azad joined the Cabinet after Asaf Ali became the ambassador to
Washington.
Patel preferred as his residence the round house at 1
Aurangzeb Road (in October1946 from Birla House, their home in Delhi before moving
over) while Nehru, who opted for a house on York Road, met regularly. Nehru
often walked over to Patel’s house. Patel needed a confidential aide and
Moraraji Desai suggested Vidya Shankar. He was selected. He, along with Vapal
Pangunni Menon aand Hirubhai M. Patel were the three closest associates who
played crucial roles in the last four years of Vallabhbhai’s life.
The Interim government ministry was formed but it did not
meet till Dec 46. The Congress pressed for the acceptance of May 16 proposal while
the League demanded the acceptance of
compulsory grouping. The Congress leaders were invited by the government for talks in London. Vallabhbhai refused to
go but Nehru, induced by Atlee, went. The outcome was a victory of the League.
The declaration that followed was seen as a betrayal. According to this, the
Muslims of Assam could decide about the grouping of Assam and the Punjab could
determine the fate of Sindh and N.W.F.Province.
Vallabhbhai wrote to Gandhi: “I did not go...He (Nehru)
should not have gone either. But, he did not listen. Now he has come back with
a defeat.”[15]
By now, Vallabhbhai had found too many issues before hand
and he had decided to go his way without breaking his association with his dear
ones. His speeches of this period were considered “inflammatory” by some, as he
talked of teaching the people to “meet the sword by sword” and he was not happy
the way Jawaharlal and people who loved him disagreed to his views. In a letter
dated 30 December, 1946, Gandhi had been critical of Patel’s speeches. The
latter almost dismissed these allegations. He remained, however, with all
differences with other leaders, the man who did the work most effectively for
the organisation. His approach was such that there was no scope of any
ambiguity. In 1946 when B. R. Ambedkar proposed the mass conversion of members
of Scheduled Castes to other religions Patel responded that if they changed
religion, they could not claim benefits as Harijans. The issue did not go
further.
Sardar’s simplicity and directness made him an ideal
organisation man. His daughter Maniben Patel, who devoted her life to her
father, has written that he travelled second-class and she used to spread his
bedding at night and retire to a third class compartment.[16]
One of the remarkable qualities of Vallabhbhai was his
ability to choose the right person for the right job and give him the
confidence to go ahead. H. M. Patel has given a remarkable example of how he
made his associates feel inspired:
When partition was decided on, and
the task of partitioning of assets and liabilities of the country and its
administrative and other organisations was taken in hand, the Sardar invited
some 40 or 50 Indian officers who had been appointed to the various committees
set up by the Partition Council of the Cabinet working through a Steering
Committee of two, Mohammad Ali on behalf of Pakistan and myself on behalf of
India.
The
Sardar spoke somewhat in the following terms:
“I have invited you all today to say just
this. You are being entrusted work of
the greatest importance to our country. It has to be completed in a very short
time. I have no doubt you will apply yourself to the task with zeal and
accomplish it with thoroughness and fairness. Let me tell you that I have
always been happiest when I have been engaged in working for the country. I am
inviting you to join me today and participate in the same happiness.[17]
Shankara
Prasada, Secretary, Kashmir Affairs (1958-65) has also noted that the most
outstanding quality of Sardar was his capacity to command the allegiance and
unstinted loyalty of the Civil Servants who came into his contact.[18]
At the end, one may say that any
study of the speeches and letters of Patel must take into consideration, at
least, two points: Patel was very categorical and his statements were primarily
aimed to people who were to be addressed directly; and secondly, Patel said
what he thought was correct and practical. Consider this short letter to
Gandhi- “... In NWF Province both Hindus and Sikhs are butchered. In Calcutta also
the condition of Hindu is worsening. I did not like the appeal published in
paper in yours and Jinnah’s name. It is against your understanding. But now
what can be done ?”[19]
We should also remember the
challenge he was facing in those troubled times. A careful scrutiny would
reveal that Patel was not handling affairs as a pragmatic statesman rather than
a communal one. Patel had said to the Viceroy that if any violence by the
Congress Government of the NWFP could be proved, he would hold himself personally
responsible. But, unless the Muslim League withdrew their Direct Action threat,
there would be a disaster.[20] To get
a sense of how pragmatic consideration was in his mind one can see his letter
to G. C. Narang in which he has defended his speech at Merrut in which many had
found a Hindu bias. He wrote –“ I still stand by that, but that speech does not
indicate that I am going to provide swords for the Hindus in the Frontier or in
the Punjab or in any other minority areas. My advice to them was to be prepared
to defend their lives, property and the honour of their womenfolk. After all,
when the third party is going to disappear, in the transitional period, trouble
is bound to arise, and the unfortunate people residing in the minority areas
have to bear the brunt... It is no use demoralizing them by simply raising
cries ...That would not help them at all.”[21]
One can also see that he was not conciliatory towards Hindu organisation
leaders. His response to Jathmal Parsram on 12 May 1947 can be seen how nasty
he could be to a Hindu leader. [22] He
also wrote that the Hindus must not migrate from Sindh as late as 23 May, 1947.[23]
Sardar seems to have said things in
the plainest possible manner. In a significant letter to Gandhi, he wrote on 7
January, 1947 –It is my habit to speak out unsavoury truths to people in the
plainest manner. He also mentioned that there “are alienations in the Working
Committee... since long” and it was not a new thing. But, he added “most of us
are working as team.” [24]
In conclusion, it can be said that
Patel was the part of the team who was doing his duty in his own pragmatic
nationalist way and to find in him “rabid communal” person is historically
untenable if we keep in mind the context in which he hold the crucial position
of the organisation man of the Congress and the Home Minister of the
Government. His differences with Nehru had not been understood properly. With
all their differences these two leaders remained in the same team. They were
too great politicians to wage ideological battle at that critical time.
[1] Patel was seen as a
Hindu communal Congress leader both by the Muslim leaders like Jinnah and the
British Viceroy Wavell. Lord Wavell, the Viceroy reported to the British King
in October 1946 that Patel was “frankly communal” (Transfer of Power, Vol. 8, page 772). Sir Archibald Nye, the last
Governor of Madras Province, had sent a report to London in 1951 gives us an
idea of how Patel was seen by the British. To Nye, “Patel was quintessential
Hindu nationalist”. (Cited in A. G. Noorani, ‘Patel’s Communalism –a documented
record’,Frontline, 13 September,
2013). Noorani’s approach to these two leaders is summed up in his own words:
“Nehru was cultured and refined. Patel was coarse to a degree. Nehru had a
world view. Patel was ignorant of world affairs. Nehru was great despite his serious flaws and grave failures. Patel was
small and mean despite his admirable qualities.”(Emphasis added), Ibid,
p.9. Historians like S. Gopal has also seen it somewhat similarly in his highly
influential biography of Nehru.
[2] Moon ed. Wavell, p. 120, cited in Rajmohan
Gandhi, Patel: A Life, Navajivan
Publishing House, Ahmedanbad, 1990, p. 343.
[3] Gadgil, Government from Inside, p. 2, cited in
Gandhi, Ibid, p.343.
[4] Rajmohan Gandhi, Op.
cit, p. 345.
[5] Tahmankar, Patel, p. 18, cited in Rajmohan Gandhi,
Ibid, p. 350.
[6] Louis Fischer has
mentioned that Nehru told him in 1946 that the British were not leaving.
[7] Ghosh, Gandhi’s
Emissary, p. 167, cited in R Gandhi, Ibid, p. 365-66.
[8] File 4/33, Pyarelal
Papers, cited in R Gandhi, Op.cit.,
p. 370.
[9] D M P, cited by R
Gandhi, p. 371.
[10] Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biiography Vol One, OUP, Delhi, 2012 [ 1975], p.326.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Op. cit., p. 327. It is
true that even Vallabhbhai Patel had similar views but saying it publically and
thereby giving Jinnah an excuse to go out of negotiation space was a bad move.
[14] Shankar, Reminiscences (1), p. 27, cited in R Gandhi, p.379.
[15] Cited in R. Gandhi, p.
381.
[16] Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945-50 (hereafter SPC), ed. Durga Das,
Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1971, p.xlvii. She started to remain
with him after 1934 when the work load increased and large number of people
started to come and meet him in the station.
[17] See SPC 1, p.lvii.
[18] Ibid, lviii.
[19] Letter to M. K. Gandhi,
21 April 1947, P. N. Chopra edited, Collected
Works of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Vol. XII, p. 64, cited in Sucheta
Mahajan, Towards Freedom 1947 Part 1,
ICHR, OUP, 2013 p.853.
[20] Mountbatten Papers,
File 96 A, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, cited in Sucheta Mahajan ed., Op.
cit., p. 949.
[21] Cited in Sucheta
Mahajan Op. Cit, p. 961.
[22] Ibid, p. 1037.
[23] See his letter to R. K.
Sidhwa in Sucheta Mahajan, Op. cit., p. 1040.
[24] Letter to Gandhi, 7
January, 1947, in Sucheta Mahajan, Op. cit, p.141.
